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CEP

No, 71"1059 OT 1971
Kern County Land Co, y. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Cert to CA 2 (Friendly, Moore & Timbers)
Section 16(b), Securities Exchange Act Case.
Petr brought this 16(b) action to recover short .. swing
profits made by resp, a statutory "insider."

The USDC for

SDNY (Palmieri, USDJ) entered summary judgment for petr in
the total amount of the short-swing profits, $19,506,419.22.
CA 2 reversed, and directed that summary judgment be entered
for respp even though resp had not requested such relief in
CA 2o
In May 1967 res£, Occidental Petroleum Corp., made a
cash tender offer for up to 1,000,000 shares of Kern County
Land Company (Old Kern),

Pursuant to this offer, by early

June resp acquired 887,000 shares of Old Kern, for which resp
paid over 75 million dollars.

These~

purchases gave resp

more than 20% of the outstanding shares of Old Kern, and thus
made resp a statutory

11

insider 11 for i6(b) purposes,

Old Kern's

management quickly arranged a defense merger with Tenneco.
Under the Old Kern ..Tenneco agreement, Tenneco was to acquire
all the assets and business of Old Kern in exchange for shares
of a new Tenneco Convertible Preference Stock, which was to
be distributed to Old Kern shareholders in exchange for their
Old Kern common stock.

-

This agreement was approved by the

-----~
Ol~er':!._ bo~~with~ oft~ ~~unce;!!Lent...9f ~sp's
._.

--

tender offer.

'-'""'

While the details of the Old Kern ..Tenneco

agreement were being worked out, Tenneco was also in negotiation with resp.

These negotiations resulted in an agreement

by resp not to oppose the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, and the
signing of a option agreement on June 2, 1967, less than one
month after resp announced its tender offer.

The option gave

Tenneco the assignable right to purchase, the Tenneco shares
that resp would receive as an Old Kern shareholder at $105
per share,

The option could be exercised at any time after

December 9, 1967, six months and one day after resp's last
contemplated purchase of Old Kern shares.

The expiration

date of the option was keyed to the Old Kern .. Tenneco closing
date,

For this option, Tenneco paid (non.. refundible) $10

per share, or $8,886,230,

If the option were exercised, this

sum was to be credited against the purchase price.

The only

circumstance under which the option price was to be returned
was the failure of the Old Kern.. Tenneco plan to close by
July 31, 1968, over a year away.
The Old Kern ... Tenneco agreement closed on August 30, and
resp became irrevocably entitled to the Tenneco preference
shares, within 4 months of its purchase of 20% of the Old Kern
common,

The IRS had ruled that the Old Kern-Tenneco transaction

would be a tax-free exchange only if Tenneco rid itself of
the option.

Tenneco therefore sold 'the option to Loeb, Rhoades

prior to the e,losing.
days after its last

On December 11, six months and three

p~rchase

of Old Kern shares, resp tendered

its Old Kern shares for Tenneco preference shares.

Loeb,

Rhoades immediately exercised the option, paying resp $84,229,185.
This sum, together with the nearly 9 million dollars that
Tenneco paid for the option amd dividends received on the
Tenneco preference shares, yielded resp a net profit of
million.

$19~

As the president of resp said to Fortune, "That

isn't bad for two weeks • work."
Resp knew that it was in 16(b) trouble, and believed
that .i t could get the SEC to promulgate a rule exempting it
and other tender offerors who found themselves in the same
situation.

The SEC refused.

Then, when it became apparent

that the Old Kern-Tennec~ agreement would close within six
months of resp's purchases of Old Kern shares, resp sought to
delay the closing beyond the six month period by having a
barrage of lawsuits filed in courts in Texas, California,
and Nebraska.

This, too, failed.

In October 1967, before the exercise of the option by
Loeb, Rhoades, and following the institution of two derivative actions by Old Kern shareholders, New Kern (a subsidiary
of Tenneco created to receive the assets and business of Old
Kern) filed this action under 16(b) to recover respgs short•
swing profits.

--

The USDC granted summary judgment for petr,

holding, alternativelya

(1) the option was a "sale" within

the meaning of section 16(b), and (2) the exchange of Kern
shares for Tenneco shares pursuant to the merger was a "sale"
within the meaning of 16(b).

Since both of these events

occurred within six months of resp's "purchase" of Kern shares,

the USDC held that either was sufficient to impose 16(b)
liability on resp and require resp to disgorge its short-swing
profits.

---------

CA 2 reversed, holding that the grant of the option was

----

----·----~-

.!!.QJ: a "sale" within the meaning of 16(b), and that exchange of

-

s.JN

the shares pursu.n: to the merger was not a "sale" within the

~

---~------

meaning of 16(b).

~

CA 2 held that the "sale" by resp occurred

only when the option was exercised by the optionee, Loeb,

~.}

Rhoades.

Since this "sale" occurred more than 6 months after
under 16(b)
the last purchase, CA 2 held that resp was not liable/to

the corporation of which it was a statutory

"insider~

IHOOUf

Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides thata
"The terms 'sale • and

1/

,,

10

sell 0 each include any contract to sell

or otherwise dispose of, 11

With respect to petr • s contention

that the option agreement constituted a "sale" of Old Kern
shares, CA 2 helda
We recognize also that an option entitling the
optionee to purchase is a contract to sell in XHH a
dictionary sense. But the established rule in this
circuit has been that the
mere grant of an option
--......_,__........,______.... .
.
to purchase is not a sale for purposes of §16(b);
this occurs only when the optionee exercises the
option, Silverman y. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2 Cir.
1962)
~

~

~-

This disregard of the normal meaning of language is interesting,
especially in light of this passage from Bershad y. McDonough,
428 Fo2d 693, 696 (CA 7 1970), which this Court cited with
approval this Term in Reliance Electric Co. y. Emerson Electric
Co,, No. 70-79, decided 1/11/72a
In order to achieve its goalsp Congress chose
a relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy administration. The objective standard of 16(b) imposes

-5-

strict liability upon substantially all trans•
actions occurring within the, statutory time period,
regardless of the intent of the insider or the
existence of actual speculation. This approach
maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate
speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in
proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was
deemed necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic
effect.
CA 2 apparently believed that a transaction should not be
considered a DIM "sale" unless it offerred some potential
for speculative abuse.

Although it may be appropriate to

inquire into the potential for speculative abuse when faced
with an unusual transaction which does not clearly fall
within the statutory definition of XXD "sale," in light
of the prophylactic purpose of 16(b) such an inquiry seems
inappropriate if the transaction falls within the "dictionary"
meaning of the statutory definition of "sale."

CA 2 reasoned

that resp had sold a "put" rather than a "call," and that

I

it was impossible to see how resp took unfair advantage of
its position as an insider.

CA 2 noteda

As indicated, the option price was precisely
what Occiaental's investment adviser had estimated
the value of the Tenneco stock to be a fortnight
before. Indeed, the option might have proved
disadvantageous to Occidental if the Tenneco stock
had boomed or if someone desiring to make a target
of Tenneco had come forward with an offer to
Occidental. The option seems to us to have been
a straight-forward business arrangement between
one company that found itself in the undesired posi ...
tion of becoming "locked in" as a large minority
stockholder and a second company that was eager
to remove the threat this imposed, if economic
circumstances permitted.

Aside from the fact that it is factually inaccurate to say
that resp was "locked in" as a minority stockholder in

Tenneco, this analysis has nothing to do with 16(b).

It

sounds as if the CA 2 thought it was ' faced with a "sale of
control" case.

Any insider who sells within six months takes

the risk that his sale will be "disadvantageous," because
the stock price may go even higher, or because the company
may become a target of several tender offerors.

CA 2 really

seems to have lost sight of what 16(b) is all about.
With respect to petr's second contention, that the
exchange of shares pursuant to the merger was a "sale"
within the meaning of 16(b), CA 2 again took a "potential

___________

....___
for speculative abuse" approach, and
held that there was

-

....

no "sale" because the exchange was forced upon resp rather

-------

than arranged by resp.

-----

CA 2 emphasized that resp had no

ability to control whether or not the merger would take
place.

~~
~~

I think that the "potential for speculative abuse" ·..

~~

approach is much more appropriate here because (1) the

statutory definition does not clearly cover an involuntary ~
fllr&lo\11\f -1. ~ merger
conversion[over which a shareholder has no potential for
control, and (2) the element of involuntariness negates the
assumption that inside information is involved in a short
swing purchase and sale.

CA 2 recognized that an exchange
pursuant to a merger would be considered a "sale" if the

I

merger was instigated by an insider with power to prevent
it from going through.
Returning to the first point, CA 2 9 s holding that the
sale of an option involves no potential for speculative

,~1

/

this statement from Bershad is
worth consideringa
The insider's sale of options in his stock is
well adapted to speculation and abuse of inside
information whether or not the option is subsequently

-7exercised. The sale of the right to purchase the
underlying security is itself· a means of realizing
a profit from that security.. The right to purchase
stock ' at a given price under specified circumstances, although clearly not identical to the
rights attendant upon ownership of the stock itself,
derives from and is' dependent upon the value of the
underlying security. Sale of such purchase rights
provides an easy vehicle for the use of inside information in extracting profits from the stock
itself.
I am inclined to think that the sale of an option does contain great potential for speculative abuse.
very case.

J

Consider this

Old Kern was trading at $63.62> when resp made

its offer to purchase one million shares at $83.50 plus $1.50
per share as commission for all shares tendered through a broker.
The Old Kern-Tenneco agreement, reached eleven days after
resp's tender offer, was worth $105.00 per Old Kern share.
At this point, under my view of 16(b), resp was locked in
for six months, like all insiders.

I am disinclined to think

that I would conclude that an involuntary conversion pursuant
to the Old Kern .. Tenne6o merger would be a "sale" imposing
16(b) liability on resp;- Hmvever, resp now owns 20% of a
company whose shares have been tremendously inflated in
two weeks 0 time.

Assuming that resp, through access to

inside information (this is the 16(b) irrebutable presumption),
knows that the Old Kern shares are not worth $105, what
does resp, locked in for six months do7

The answer is that

he uses his inside information to obtain $9,000,000 for an
option, knowing that the DJOIOeDXI!lXII!UIOOOIXXMXDXX Old Kern
shares, or whatever replaces them, will not hold a $105 value,
and knowing that the option price will enable him to cut his
inevitable market paper losses by $9,000,000.

-8-

CA 2 was disturbed at the prospect
that resp, who had
' .
produced much good fcbrtune for Old Kern shareholders by
'

inducing this valuable defensive merger, would be excluded
from the profits realized by all other shareholders.
reasoning is unsound for several reasons,

This

First, it is in-

consistent with CA 2's conclusion that an insider who engineers
a merger within 6 months of becoming an insider is liable
under 16(b).

Such an insider spreads just as much "good

fortune" among the other shareholders as did resp.

Second,

it is by no means clear that the merger did produce "good
fortune" for Old Kern shareholders.

The exchange was tax

freep and many Old Kern holders were undoubtedly long term
investors,

Most people in there position, who took "funny

money" (convertible subordinated debentures or convertible
preferred) from a conglomerate, soon saw their paper profits
turn into losses of horrifying proportions, Third, the
of the late 1960's
damage that the frantic merger activity/did to stable financial
markets by wildly inflating market prices outweighs any
short term
/good deeds that tender offerors performed, It did not take
the government long to recognize that this merger and acquisi ..
tion activity was detrimental to the long term health of the
economy,
In sum, CA 2's approach to 16(b) undercuts its salutary
purpose,

The area is very important.

Although there may not

be square conflicts inCA holdingsp theCA's do take conflicting approaches.
GRANT
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MEMO:

1\,IEMORANDUM

TO:

:Mr. Justice White

FROM:

l .ewts F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: December 9, 1972

No. 71-1059 Kern County v. Occidental
As you reserved your decisicm in this cue, perhaps you wW

nat mind if I try to focus more sharply the views I expressed at the
Conference.

There are two questl<ms Jn the case: ( i) whether the option
constituted a "sale" within the meaning of

s 16(b); and (11) whether the

merger*, resulting in the compelled exchange of Occidental's shares
tn Old Kern for the shares of Tenneco, e<matituted a "sale" within the

meaning of the statute? My under.standing at the C<mference was that

the first question presents no diffteulty, but that you are in doult as to
the answer to the second. It is this question, which I will address
briefly. ••

•The transacttc:m actually took the form of a transfer of the business and
assets of Old Kern to New Kem (a subsidiary of Tenneco created for the
purpoee) in exchange for preference stock of Tenneco, followd by the
liquidation of Old Kern and distribulton in liquidation of the Tenneco shares
to the stoctholders of Old Kern. The parties are in agreement that the

transaetioo is the equivalent, for present purposes, or a statutory merger
if It be assumed that all of the other elements (required vote, absenee
ot dissenters' rights, etc.) are present.
**Actually, I can add nothing - except my OW'Il experience - to what ts aald
ln Oceidental's brief and to a lesser extent In Judge Friendly's optnlOD•

_____

.....,

----

-----------

---~

·--~---------:------~~

•.

--

2.
I beUeve the etatut tt elf eompels a negative answer to the
question. It authorizes recovery of "any profit reaUzed by (a to%

equtty owner} from any purchase or sale, or any aale or purchase, of
any equity security of such lsauer • • • withm any period of less than
six m(Xtths ••• " The ecmeept ot a purcbaae or a sale necessarily

connotes volition,

!· !: ,

a willing or conscious act <m the part of the 1o%

owner. There was no such act in this case, and the absence of it seems
to me to be dispositive.
The exchange o1 securities resulting from the ttznerger", was
compelled by California law following acti<m taken by parties hostile

to Occidental The relevant undisputed facts are as follows:
1. The Kern-Tenneco negctiatlons. were initiated for
the express purpose of frustrating Occidental' a tender offer,
and they did not commence until Occidental was irrevocably
committed to accept tenders and thereby become a .Kern
stoekholder.
2.

The Tenneeo offer was so much higher than either the

market price of Kern stock or: Occidental's tender offer, it was

conceded that Occidental eould not bloek tbe merger.

3. In fact, some 71% of Y...ern's stockholders- excluding
Occidental .. voted for the merger. Ninety-nine percent of

3.
all shares v«tng at the stockholders meetblg favored the
merger.
4. Qectdental abstained from

vctin~

announcing at the

time that it could not make a better offer, although it would
have preferred an OCcidental-Kern merger.
5. California law required only a majority stockholders'
vcte to authorize a sale of assets and liquidation (merger).
6. California law provided no appraisal rights or any

altemative to a Kern shareholder other than receiving the
new stock.

7. Oecidental reeetved exactly the same treatment 1n the
merger as all other stockholders.
In these eireumata.Dces, it was ccmced.ed by pet1t1011er in the

District Court that Occidental "had no alternative, such as appraisal
r1gbts, to acceptmgthe results (of the merger)".

Respondent's brief

p. 56. In short, there may have been a ''shotgun weddingu but there

certainly was no sale.
There is no controlling dee1sloo of this Court and some cmfusion
in the language of the lower federal courts.

V/e are thus free to construe

the Act in accordance with Us term8 and purpose. In my view, these
are C(Xltrolling.

4.
I think it fair to say, however, that the weight of authority in
the lower eourts clearly supports the decision of CA 2, although each
case must be examined in light of its speeial facts.
Petitioner's brief states that prior to the decision in this ease,
"a long line of f 16(b) decisions had established that an exchange of

stock of <me company for that of another involves a 'sale' ••• "
Petit1Ciler's brief p. 27. This statement is phrased too generally to be
applicable to the facts of this ease. Indeed, if intended to be applicable,
the statement is misleading. There are various types of exchanges (upon

cmversiOJVJ, redemptions, reorganizations, etc. ) and some types are
the legal and economic equivalent of a sale. But I lmow of no case
whleh hole'Etbat a _E!! !!. rule must be applied to all exchanges of shares
without regard to volition, participation by the party

involve~

or the

characteristics of the transactic.m in question.
This is no place to discuss the lower court decisions. It ean
be said generally that in doubtful cases - where there may be a question

whether a transactian constitutes a npurehase or sale" -the courts
have applied a "possibUity of abuse" test which also takes tnto consideration whether the transaction was a compelled c:me. * Under this test, tt
*See Potter's optnton in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342, 346 (CA 6);
and cases cited in Respon3tmt*s Brief pp. 55-59.

5.
could hardly be said that this transaction (foreed upon Oeetdentalln
a unique factual setting) Involved either present or preeedenttal
posstblltty of abuse.
In short, I think a reversal here would do violence to the language

of the Act and In no way further its pur.pose.

Forgive me for this tntrustcm on your ''vast leisure. "

J,. F. P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: December 10, 1972

No. 71-1059 Kem County Land Co. v.
Occidental
The vote at the Conference an Friday was 4 to 4, with Justice

White reserving his vote and wtth Justice Blackmun expressing his
view as "tentative".

The Chief .Justice, and Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and l
voted to affirm. l feel quite strongly that the case should be affirmed
and that a reversal would be a serious distortian of the letter and intent
of § 18(b) of the 1934 Act.

Accordingly, I will want to write regardless of whether Justice
White comes down on my side. As I led the dlseussian at the Conference,
I would think the chances are good that the opintoo would be assigned

to me U we have a majority. If I am in the minority, I will wish to
dissent.
This is Larry's case, but in view of his other obligatlans, I

hope you. will be agreeable - with his approval - to taking over in hts
place.
l think the opinion will be a fairly easy one to write. There
are two clear-cut questions, both well briefed.

_ ...

.,...
_ .........,._....._ _.........._ _-c_ _ _ _ _ _

_____ ___ .,

,

,.

-

....

.

__ I

2.
All members of the Court with the exception of Justices Douglas
and Brennan were 1n aeeord thtl.t the option agreement did not constitute

a sale. Petitioner relies on the Bershad ease (CA 7), whteh was etted
tn a footnote in Emerson Eleetrie, 404 U. S. 417, 423. The Bershad ease

is easily distinguished, as the option there was in reality a spurious
one. 'lbe down payment was large (15%) the option ran for only two
moo.ths, the optionee was immediately given a proxy to vote the stock,
the optionee also went on the board of directors, the option price was
below the market priee, and there was no possibility of the down payment
being retumed under any etreumstanees.
As to the seecmd point (whether the "ne rger" resulted in a "sale"),
I refer you to my memorandum of this date to Justtee White.

I wUl be happy, of eourse, to discuss any aspect of this with

you. There 1s obvious advantage in our etreulattng a draft at a fairly
early date.
L. F. P., Jr.

~u:puntt <!f'trttrl trf tlrt 'J!lttittb j;tatta

'Ulaafringhttt, ~.

<If.

2llc?~ql

.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. w 'HITE

December ll, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 71-1059 -Kern County Land Company v.
Occidental Petroleum Cor,p .
I had intended to vote to affirm in this case but

did not do so at conference.

My hesitation was

occasioned by my thought that the option was the major
issue in the case, only to discover that two of the
Brethren considered the exchange, rather than the option,
determinative.

The question in that respect is closer

than I thought, but I still can't accept an involuntary
exchange occasioned by merger as a "sale" for the purpose of§ l6(b).
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

December 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 71-1059

-

Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

My vote at the conference on this case was to reverse, but the vote was tentative. On further study of the
matter over the weekend, I am now tentatively inclined the
other way. This is prompted by a conclusion, still somewhat unfirm, that the exchange of stock, compulsory as it
was, was not a sale under Section 16(b).
Sincerely,

J6..4·

/

~u.prrnte

<!fourt of

t~e 'Pttilib ~tates

'J)trasJrbtgtcn. p. Qt.

2llbi'1,3

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

March 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE:
In due course I will circulate a
dissent in 71-1059, Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

0

~0\)/
William.~uglas

The Conference

/

· Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
"

:'>'

~if_1

-~

It is possible that I may do a short concurrence limited specifically
to the status of a compelled exchange by virtue of a merger. I know from
my own experience that the practicing bar would like more definitive
guidance on this hazy area. It may well be that nothing constructive can
be added to what you have said already, but if I can find the time I may
take a look at it.
tn any event, I am with you.
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CHAMBERS OF

March 8, 1973

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Sincerely,L
T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

v

Conference

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: March 10, 1973

. No. 71-1059 Kern County v. Occidental
" -·--Here is a draft of a proposed concurrence in Kern.
I know you have not studied this carefully, and in view of your

other priorities I do not want you to go back to the books or even the briefs.
Merely take a look at what I have written and see whether you think it
hangs together.
I am in about 95% accord with Justice White's opinion, but it does

seem to me that he applies unnecessarily the "possibility of abuse" test
when in fact this was a "compelled" exchange, over which Occidental
had no control or influence whatever.
I know from my professional experience that this is an area which

creates considerable doubt and confusion. My concurrence will not help
much, but it may put the question which lawyers usually are called upon
to answer in a little sharper focus.
L. F. P., Jr.

No. 71-1059 Kem Coonty Land Co.
Occidental Petroleum
Dear Byron:
1 am' thinking of filing a concurrence in Kern County along the
lines of the enclosed draft, unless you prefer that I net do so.

)\

,,~

I think you have written a fine opinion. The purpose of my
concurrence is merely to sharpen up one point with a somewhat
different emphasis.

Sincerely,
"

Mr. Justice 'White
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 12, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1059 - Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp

Dear Lewis:
I have no objection whatsoever to your filing the
concurrence appended to your note of March 12.
With respect to your first point--whether we should
inquire into the "possibility of abuse 0 --it must be
remembered that when Occidental extended its tender offer
on May 11, it was already a 10% shareholder of the company.
At least with respect to the shares acquired thereafter I
would suppose the inquiry would be appropriate. If there
was a possibility of abuse, whether these shares obtained
by the tender offer should be treated as having been
obtained all at one time or at separate times is a question unresolved by cases in this Court.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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CHA"'BER S OF'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 30, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1059 - Kern County v. Occidental

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,

h
Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 3, 1973

71-1059 - Kern Cty. Land Co.
v. Occidental Petroleum
Dear Bill,
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Douglas

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBEfS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN , .JR.

April 4, 1973

RE: No. 71-1059 Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent in the
above.
Sincerely,
(_' "

y / '~{ ( '
Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conference

......
'--• ..~;.;t·:;:

No. 71-1059 Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
1

Dear Byron:
I write to reaffirm my joining in your opinion for
the Court, and to say that I probably will not file the brief
concurring opinion which I drafted. Thus, if everyone has
voted and the case is ready to come down, it can be cleared
at our April 13th Conference.
Sincerely,

cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

)

April 5, 1973

Re:

No. 71-1059 -

Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum

Dear By,.
1-'lease join me.
Sincerely,

;!. [t.. ;JMr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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· CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

May 3 , 1973

Re:

No . 71-1059 -Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.

Dear Byron:
Please join me .
Regards,

Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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To: The Chie~ Justice
Mr. Justice Douglaa
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr . Justice Stewart
Mr . Justice Marshall
· J ustice Blackmun
./ . ' J ustice Powell
Tustice Rehnquist
From: White, J.
1st DRAFT

Circulated:
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Recirculated:

Xo. 71-1059
Kern County Land Company.
Petitioner.
On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the SecOccidC'n tal Petroleum
ond Circuit.
Corporation.
lMarch - . Hl731
MH.
Court.

Jt'STICE

\YHI'l'E

delivered the op1mon of the

Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
48 Stat. 896. 15 U. S. C. ~ 78p (b).' provides that officers.
directors. and holders of more than 10% of the listed
'"For thr pmpo~r of prennting thr unfair u~r of information
ll'hirh mn~· hn ,.r brrn obtninrd by such brnrfirinl owner. dirrrtor. or
offirrr b~- rr:1;;on of his relntionship to thr i ~~ur r, nny profit rrnlizrd
h" him from nn~- purrhnsr nnd ~ulr, or nn~· snlr nnd pmrhn~<>. of nn~·
<'(Ill it~- ~('Cill'it~· of SUC'h i~Sllet• rot hn t hnn f\ n ('Xf'Inptrd S('Cttrit ~·j
\\'ithin nn~· period of lrss than six month~. unlrss . nrh srr mit~· wns
11cqnirrrl in good fnith in ronnrction with n debt previously ront rnrtrd. shnll imtrr to :mel br rrco\'Nnhlr by the i~suN, irrrsprrtin'
of nnY intrntion on the pnrt of such brnrfirinl owner, dirrrtor, or
offirN in rnt rring into such trnnsart ion of holding thr s<>rurit~· pmC'hased or of not repnrchnsinp; the ser mit~r sold for n period rxrrrcling~ix months. Suit to recovrr surh Jlrofit ma~· be institutrd nt Jnw or
in rquit~· in any court of competent juri~ctirtion h~· the is<"ttPr, orb~·
thr owner of an~· srcurity of the i<"suer in thr name and in behalf
of the i<"snrr· if th<> issuer shall fail or rrfu~e to bring such snit
\\·ithin s i:-..i~· dn~·s aft<>r reque~t or shall fail dilig:rntly to pro<"rcute
thr l"ame thNraft<>r; bnt no such suit shnll be brought more than
two ~-rars nftrr the dntr surh profit was rrnlizrd. This snb~rrtion
~hnll not br construed to cover nny trnnsnrtion whrre surh brnrfirinl
ownrr was not surh both nt. the timr of the purchaf:e nncl snlr, or

-----
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stock of any company shall be liable to the company for
any profits realized from any purchase and sale of such
stock occurring within a period of six months. Unquestionably, one or more statutory purchases occurs when
one company, seeking to gain control of another, acquires
more than 10% of the stock of the latter through a tender
offer made to its shareholders. But is it a § 16 (6)
"sale" when the target oHtender offer defends itself by
merging into a third company and the tender offeror
then exchanges his stock for the stock of the surviving
company and also grants an option to purchase the latter
stock that is not exercisable within the statutory six
months period'? This is the question before us in this
case.
I
On May 8, 1967, after unsuccessfully seeking to merge
with Kern County Land Company (Old Kern),~ Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental) " announced
an offer, to expire on June 8, 1967, to purchase on a firstcome, first-served basis 500,000 shares of Old Kern comthe snle nne! purcba~r, of the seruritr invoh·ecl, or an~ · tr~111~nction
or trnn;,:actionH which the Commission b~· rule~ and reg;ulations ma~·
rxrmpt ns not romprchenclrd within thr purpo~r of this sub~ect ion."
15 U. S. C. § 78p (b).
2 Old Kern wns a California corporntion hnving ;.;11hstanti;tl rral
rstntr holdings, including oil producing In ncb, oil rxplora tion net il·itiE's, cattlE' ranching;, caitlE' fpeding operations. and intrrr~ts in the
mnnufacturc of automotive P<lrt~, clrctronir sy~tcms nnd dr,·icrs,
and farm mnchinrr~· :-tnd construction equipment. After the reorg:mizntion described in text, Old Kern became known a~ the 600
California Corporation until its cYcntunl dis~olution llnclrr California
law on October 6, 1967.
"Ocridrntal is rrs]1ondcnt· in this Court. A California corporation with its principal plarc of businE'ss in Cnlifornia, Occidrnt nl i~
rngag;rd in the production and snlr of oil, ga~, coal, sulphur. and
fertilizers.
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mon stock ' at a price of $88.50 per share plus a brokerage commission of $1.50 per share." By May 10, 1967.
500,000 shares. more than 10% of the outstanding shares
of Old Kern. 6 had been tendered. On May 11, Occidental extended its offer to encompass an additional
500.000 shares. At the close of the tender offer, on
June 8, 1967, Occidental owned 887,549 shares of Old
K ern.'
Immediately upon the announcement of Occidental's
tender offer, the Old Kern management undertook to
frustrate Occidental 's takeover attempt. A management
letter to all stockholders cautioned against tender and
indicated that Occidental's oft"er might not be the best
available. since the management \vas engaged in merger
discussions ,,·ith several companies. When Occidental
Thr Old Krrn stork wa~ rrp:i ~ terrd punmnnt to § 12 of tlw Rrrurit ir~ and Exrhnnp:r Art of 19:34, as amrnded, 15 U. S. C. § 78.
The stork wa H a nonrxempt, r(Jttit~' ~rrurit y for purposr ;; of § 16 (b) .
" Thr Old Krrn ~tork closrd at 63% on Frida~·, Ma~' 8, 1967, thr
la ~ t. 1radinp: dn~ · prior to thr amlmmcrm r nt of thr tendrr offrr. Tt
had renrhrd n high of ()-1-% and n. low of 57% in 1967. a high of 761/4.
and a low of 51% in 1966. n high of 71 % and a low of .')6 in 19fl5,
:md a high of 70% :mel a low of 56'Y!-! in 1964. Tl1Us, thr 885 p r r
;:hnrr trndrr offer price rrprr8rnlrd a substa ntial profi t for ~ harr
holder>< of Old Krrn.
n On l\In~· 10, Old K ern hnd 4,328,000 "harrs out standing.
7
On Mn~· IS, 1967, Ocridrntnl fil r d a Form ::!, Initi:ll Statrmrnt
of Hrnrfirinl OwnrrRhip of Srruritie;;, with 1he Srruritirs and Exrh:mgr Commi ~s ion indirnting dirret ownrrship of 507 ,055 shnrrs of
Old Krrn stock ; on .June 9, 1967, Oceidrntnl filrd n Form 4, Statr mrnt of Chnnges in Benrfirinl Ownrrship of Sccuritirs. for thr month
of '\1 a ~·, indicating thr purchase of nn additional ::!76.326 8harrs of
Old K ern o;tock. for a 1otnl ownership as of Ma~· ::!1, 1967, of 83 .381
;:hares. An additional 4.168 shnres wNr purchn F<rd h~· .Tunr 8, 1967,
~ o that nF< of .Tunr 30, 1967 , Ocridrntal hrld 8S7,549 s h a re.~ of Old
Krrn ~ tork. This figure inrludrd 1,900 shnrrs whirh Orridrntal purrha~ rd on thr oprn markrt in April 1967. Section 10 (b) linbility
i" not n s~r rtrd with rrspcct to thr~r s hnre ~ , because thrse purrhn sr s
diclJlot mnkr Occidental a "bmrfiri:~l owner" for pmposr s of§ 16 (b).
4
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extended its tender offer, the president of Old Kern sent
a telegram to all stockholders again advising against
tender. In addition, Old Kern undertook merger discussions with Tenneco, Inc. (Tenneco) ,8 and, on May 19,
1967, the Board of Directors of Old Kern announced that
it had approved a merger proposal advanced by Tenneco. 9
Under the terms of the merger, Tenneco would acquire
the assets, property, and goodwill of Old Kern, subject
to its liabilities, through "Kern County Land Company"
(New Kern), 10 a new corporation to be formed by Tenneco to receive the assets and carry on the business of
Old Kern. The shareholders of Old Kern would receive
a share of Tenneco cumulative convertible preference
stock in exchange for each share of Old Kern common
stock which they owned. On the same clay, May 19,
Occidental, in a quarterly report to stockholders, appraised the value of the new Tenneco stock at $105 per
share. 11
8 Tenneco, a Delaware corporation, is a diversified indust rial company with operations in natural gas transmi~sion, oil and gas. chrmicals, packaging, manufacturing, and shipbuilding. Tenneco is not
a party to this litigation.
!J Although technically a sale of assets, the corporate combination
has been consistently referred to by the parties as a "merger" and
will be similarly denominated in this opinion. The only significance
of the characterization is the fact that a sale of assets requirrd. under
California law, approval of only a majority of the Old Kern shareholders and provided no appraisal rights for dissenters.
1.o New Kern, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in California, is petitioner in this Court and iR a wholly
owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corporation. Tenneco Corporation is,
in turn, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco and owns all of the
capital stock or controlling interests in most of Tenneco's nonpipeline operating subsidiaries. When first incorporated, New Kern
was known as KCL Corporation.
11 The annual dividend of $5.50 per share on the new Tenneco
stock would be more than double the current ann ual dividend of
$2.60 per share on the Old Kern stock. Each sha re of 1he new

71-1059-0PINION
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Occidental, seeing its tender offer and takeover attempt
being blocked by the Old Kern-Tenneco "defensive"
merger, countered on May 25 and 31 with two mandamus
actions in the California courts seeking to obtain extensive inspection of Old Kern books and records. ~ Realizing that, if the Old Kern-Tenneco merger were approved and successfully closed, Occidental would have to
exchange its Old Kern shares for Tenneco stock and
would be locked into a minority position in Tenneco,.
Occidental took other steps to protect itself. Between
May 30 and June 2, it negotiated an arrangement with
Tenneco whereby Occidental granted Tenneco Corporation, a subsidiary of Tenneco, an option to purchase at
$105 per share all of the Tenneco preference stock to
which Occidental would be entitled in exchange for its
Old Kern stock when and if the Old Kern-Tenneco merger
was closed. 13 The premium to secure the option, at $10
per share, totaled $8,866,230 and was to be paid immediately upon the signing of the option agreement. 14 If the
1

Tenneco preference stock was convertible into 3.6 shares of Tenneco.
common stock. During 1967, Tenneco common stock had sold at a
high of 32% and a low of 20%. Moreover, in contrast to Occidental's cash offer, the Tenneco exchange was expect ed to be, and
was ultimately approved by the Internal Revenue Service as, free
of capital gains tax.
1 2 Prior to any court ruling on Occidental's mandamus petitions,.
Old Kern voluntarily permitted inspection of Old Kern's general
ledger, consolidated financial st atements, consolidated journal entries,
details of cash receipts from oil operations, supporting trial balances,
and other records over a six-day period . A Jist of stockholders,
however, was withheld .
1 'l The agreement
covered 886,623 shares. This figure is 926·
shares lrss than the number of Old Kern shares ultimately owned by
Occidental. Thi · discrepancy apparently results from un cert ainty
as to the number of shares tendered.
HAn outside investment banking firm in New York had determined thn t between $9 and $12 per share was n fair premium on an
optioll on t he Old Kern stock.

71-1059-0PINION
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option were exercised, the premium was to be applied to
the purchase price. By the terms of the option agreement, the option could not be ex~rcised prior to December 9, 1967, a date six months and one day after expiration
of Occidental's tender offer. On June 2, 1967, within six
n10nths of the acquisition by Occidental of more than
10% ownership of Old Kern, Occidental and Tenneco
Corporation executed the option. 1 " Soon thereafter, Occidental announced that it would not oppose the Old
Kern-Tenneco merger and dismissed its state court suits
against Old Kern.'r.
The Old Kern-Tenneco merger plan was presented to
and approved by Old Kern shareholders at their meeting
on July 17, 1967. Occidental refrained from voting its
Old Kern shares, but in a letter read at the meeting
Occidental stated that it had determined prior to June Z
not to oppose the merger and that it did not consider the
plan unfair or inequitable. 17 Indeed, Occidental inclicated that, had it been voting, it would have voted in·
favor of the merger.
Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission
had refused Occidental's request to exempt from possible
'"On thai date, rmd on the d:1te of the exrrrisc of the option,
Old Kern common stork \YUS sellin~J; at· approximately $95 prr :-hare ..
'" Srekin~J; to pre,·ent its acquisition of Tenneco shnres pur~uant
to the merger from being mntchrd with thr ~nle of thosr ~harrR upon
exercise of the option for pmpo~es of estahli~hin~J; § 16 (b) linbility,
Ocridental nskrd t hnt the nrw Tenneco stock not be immedint el~·
registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exrhangc Art of 1984,
15 lT. S. C. § 7Re. SeC' 4.'i0 F. 2d, at 160, n. 6.
17
The lC'tter indirntC'd thnt Occidentnl "did not ron~idcr it to he
in its brst interest, or thC' bC'st interrRt of its Rhareholder~. or i he
hr~t intC'rr~t of KCL ShnrC'holclC'r~ grnernll:v for it to ropposr] the
transnction." HowC'Yer, Occidental stnted th:1t. "riln view of the fnct
that we wonlcl rather have \\·orkccl out our own tmnRaction with KCL,
WC' shnll not Yotc om KCL shares at the KCL SharrholdPr'~ MrPting
on .Tnl.v 17, 1967." Under npplicable California law, the absiC'ntion 1\!
from Yoting \\'ilR tantamount to opposing the mrrgcr.
R1
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~ 16 (b) liability Occidental's exchange of its Old Kern
stock for the Tenneco preference shares that would take
place when and if the merger transaction were closed.
Various Old Kern stockholders, with Occidental's interests in mind. thereupon sought to delay consummation
of the merger by instituting various lawsuits in the state
and federal courts." These attempts were unsuccessful,
however. and preparations for the merger neared completion with an Internal Revenue Service ruling that consummation of the plan would result in a tax-free exchange
with no taxable gain or loss to Old Kern shareholders
and with the issuance of the necessary approval of
the merger closing by the California Commissioner of
Corporations.
The Old Kem-Tenneco merger transaction "·as closed
on August 30. Old Kern shareholders thereupon became
irrevocably entitled to receive Tenneco preference stock,
share-for-share in exchange for their Old Kern stock. Old
Kern was dis~olvecl and all of its assets, including "all
claims, demands, rights and choses in action accrued or
to accrue under and by virtue of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ... ," were transferred to New Kern.
The option granted by Occidental on June 2, 1967, was
exercised on December 11, 1967. Occidental, not having
previously availed itself of its right, exchanged certificates
representing 887,549 shares of Old Kern stock for a
certificate representing a like number of shares of Tenneco preference stock The certificate was then endorsed
over to the optionee-purchaser, and in r~n $84,229,185
\\·as credited to Occidental's accounts at various banks.
Adding to this amount the $8,886,230 premium paid in
June, Occidental received $93,905,415 for its Old Kern
stock (including the 1,900 shares acquired prior to issuance of its tender offer). In addition, Occidental re-

'' Thi~ his I or~' or this litigation is reviewed in 600 California Cm·7J.
Y.

II arjean, 284 F. Supp. 843 (ND Tex. 1968).
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ceived dividends totaling $1,793,439.22. Occidental's
total profit was $19,506.419.22 on the shares obtained
through its tender offer.
On October 17, 1967, New Kern instituted a suit under
§ 16 (b) against Occidental to recover the profits which
Occidental had realized as a result of its dealings in Old
Kern stock. The complaint alleged that the execution
of the Occidental-Tenneco option on June 2, 1967, and
\
the exchange of Old Kern shares for shares of Tenneco to
which Occidental became entitled pursuant to the merger
closed on August 30, 1967, were both "sales" within the
coverage of § 16 (b). Since both acts took place within
six months of the elate on which Occidental became the
owner of more than 10o/o of the stock of Old Kern, New
Kern asserted that § 16 (b) required surrender of the
profits realized by Occidental.'!! New Kern eventually ·
moved for summary judgment, and, on December 27,
1970, the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of New Kern. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (SDNY 1970). The District
Court held that the execution of the option on June 2,
1967, and the exchange of Old Kern shares for shares of
Tenneco on August 30, 1967, were "sales" under§ 16 (b).
The Court ordered Occidental to disgorge its profits plus
interest. In a supplemental opinion, Occidental was also
ordered to refund the dividends which it had received
plus interest.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered
summary judgment entered in favor of Occidental.
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F . 2cl 157
(CA2 1971). The Court held that neither the option nor
n Occidental answered asserting various affirmative dcfen~cs and
counterclaims. Two suits had already been instituted by Old Kern
shnreholders, and one was subsequently begun. The four suits were
consolidated.
1
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the exchange constituted a "sale" within the purview of
~ 16 (b). 20 We granted certiorari. 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
We affirm.
II
Section 16 (b) provides, inter alia, that a statutory insider 21 must surrender to the issuing corporation "any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security 22 of such
issuer ... within any period of less than six months."
As specified in its introductory clause, § 16 (b) was enacted "[f]or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by a [statutory insider] ... by reason of his relationship to the
issuer." Congress recognized that short-swing speculation by stockholders with advance, inside information
would threaten the goal of the Securities Exchange Act
20
In view of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not reach
Occidental's contentions that only the purchases in excess of 10%
of Old Kern's stock, rather than all purchases made pursuant to
the tender offer, should be included in calculating liability and that
the awards of prejudgment interest and dividends were improper.
Occidental also appealed from the dismissal of its counterclaims. The
Court of Appeals dismissed Occidental's appeal as moot.
21 For purposes of § 16 (b), a statutory inRider includes a "beneficial owner, director, or officer." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). The term
"beneficial owner" refers to one who owns "more than 10 per centum
of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 781 [§ 12] of this title."
15 U. S. C. § 78p (a).
22 The term "equity security" is defined to incl11de "any stock or
similar security; or any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying auy warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or
right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to
be of similar nalure and consider necessary or appropriate, by such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for
i he protection of investors, to treat as an equity security." 15
U. S. C. § 78c (a) (11).
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to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets."
15 U. S. C. § 78 (b). Insiders could exploit information not generally available to others to secure quick
profits. As we have noted, "the only method Congress
deemed effective to curb the evils of insider trading was
a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972). As stated in the
report of the Senate Committee, the bill aimed at protecting the public "by preventing directors, officers and
principal stockholders of a corporation ... from speculating in the stock on the basis of information not available to others." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Con g., 2d Sess., 9
(1934).~ 3

The legi~lative histor~r of § 16 (b) reveals a congre~sionnl effort
to curb short-swing trading by insic!N:; whose po~it ion gin's thrm
ncre~s to iuformation llot :ll'ailable to the inve~ti11g public and the
abilit ~· to infturnrc rorpomte polir~'·
"Among the most vicious prnrticrs unrarthrd at the hearing~ brfore
the wbrommittee wns the fbgrant betrn~·nl of thrir fidurinr~· clntirs
b~r dirrrtor" and offirrrs of corporation~ who w•rd their position:; of
t n1~t. nne! thr confident in! informal ion which eame to thrm in snrh
po.-it'ion~, to nid them in thrir mnrkrt activities. Clo~rl.v nllircl to
this type of nbu~c was the unscrupulous emplo~·mrnt of in~icle inform:-ttion b~· large ~toekholders who, while not direetors nne! ollicrrs,
cxcrri,.ed sufficient control over the drstinies of their rompnnieR to
ennhle thrm to acquire and profit by information not nvai lnble to
othrr~." S. Rrp. No. 1455. 73cl Con g., 2cl Ses,- .. 55 ( 1934).
2"

Sec a],.o 10 S. E. C. Ann. Rep. 50 (1944): R. Rrp. No. 79~, 73cl
Cong. , 2cl Ses"., 9 (1934).
"The Securities J<.xchange Act of 1984 aims to protect the interr~ts
of the public· again~t 1hr prcdntor~' opernt ionR of director~. ofllcrrs,
and principal stockholclrr" of corporations by pre,·enting them from
sprcula ting in the ~tock of the corporations to which 1he~· 011·e a
fiduriar~· dut~' .

"BY this section [16 (b) I it is rcnderrcl unlawful for
1ru~trcl

per~on~ inwith the administration of corporate affairs or vc~trcl with
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Although traditional cash-for-stock transactions that
result in a purchase and sa e or a sale and purchase within
the six-month. statutory period arc clearly encompassed
"·ithin the purview of ~ 16 (b), the courts have wrestled
" ·ith the question of inclusion or exclusion of certain
"unorthodox'' transactions."' The statutory definitions

I1

~

~uhHtanti:1l

control over corporation~ to n"r in~idr in format ion for
thrir oll'n ach·:mtagP." ~. Hrp. No. 1455, 7:3d Cong., 2cl Sr"s., fiR
(1984).
ThP pnrpo"r nnd operntion of§ 16 (b) wa~ rxplained :1~ follo\l·s by
onr of it~ draftomen.
"Thn t. r§ 1fi (b )l is to prr\·cnt di1wt or~ l'PC'Piving thr hrnrftt R of
"hort-trrm sprculntiw RwingH on the sec111'itir~ of thrir own rompnnieR. becnu~r of inRide informnt ion. Thr profit on Rurh tr:msnct ion under the bill would go to the corpomt ion. You hold thr dirrrtor. irresprctivr of nn~· intrntion or exprctntion to Rell thr i'rrnrit~·
within 6 months nftrr, brrau~e it will br nbsolute!~r impossihlr to
pron• the exiRtrnrr of Rnrh intrntion or rxprrtation. :1ncl ~·ou hnvr to
hrwe this rrudr ntlr of thumb. hecnusr ~·ou r:mnot unc!Prtnkr the burdrn of having to provr that thr director intendrd. ~t the time he
bought, to get out on n Rhort Rwing." Hr:1ring" heforr Sennte Committrr on Banking and CmTrnr~·. 7:'lcl Cong., 2d ScRs .. (i51)7 (1984).
Ser genrrnll~· Henrings on H. R. 7R52 :mel H. R. 8720 brforr thr
1Ton~r Committer on Intrr"tate nnd Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Se,s., 85 (19:~4): Hearings on S. R4, A. 56, nne! S. 07 hrforr thC'
Srnatr Commit ter on Bnnking nnd Cnrrenc~·, 72cl Cong., lst Srss.,
:mel 73d Cong., 1st nncl 2d SrRs., fi4fi3-fiMn (1934): S. Rep. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2cl Sess .. 7-9 (1934); S. Rep. No. 145!\, 78d Cong.,
2d Sr~R., 5.1-GR (1934); H. R. Rrp. No. 13R:3, 73d Cong., 2d Re~s.,
I:~-14 (1934). Srr nlso B/rm v. Lamb. 368 F. 2d 507 (CA2 19fi6):
8mnlove Y. Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 (C.\2 1943); Yourd. Trnding in Seemitirs b~· Directors, Officers nnd Stockholclrr~: Section 16
of the SrcuritieE< ExchnngC' Act, 3R Mich. L. Re,·. 138 (l!J89);
Meekrr & Cooney, The Problem of Drfinition in Determining Insidrr Li:1bilitie~ Under Section 16 (b), 45 Vn. L. Rev. 949 (19.'i9);
"\"otr. Stock Exrhangrs Pur~nnnt to Corporntr Con~oliclntion: A 1I
Rrrtion 16 (h) "Pmchnsr or Sale?," 117 U. P:1. L. Rrv. 1084 (19fi9).
4
2 The term comes from 2 L. Loss, Seeuriti
Regulation 1069 (2cu ·
rd. 1961) and hns been applied to stock conversions, exchnngcs pursu:mt to mrrgers nnd other corporate reorganizations, stock rrrln8~i
firations, and dealings in options, rights, nnd warrants.
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of "purchase" and "sale" are broad and, at least arguably,
reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale or
purchase. 2 " In deciding \vhether borderline transactions
are within the reach of the statute, the courts have come
to in uire whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle
f~r the evil which _Ql~~vent-the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to inside
information/ 6 thereby endeavoring to implement con2 " "When
used m this chapter, unless tho context otherwise
requ1res-

"(13) the terms 'bu ~·' and 'purchase' each include an~· rontru..ct to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.
"(14) the terms .'sale' or 'sell' each include an~· contract to srll or
othrrwise dispose of." 15 U.S. C. §§ 78c (a) (13), (14).
26 Several decisions hnvr been rrad as to npply n so-called "objective in interpreting and applying Section 16 (b)." Sec, e. g.,
Smolove "· Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 (CA2), ccrt. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943); Park<.~ Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984 (CA2),
cert. dcnird, 332 U. S. 761 (1947); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352
F. 2d 156 (CA3 1965). Under some broad language in those decisions, § 16 (b) is said to be applicable whether or not the transaction in question could possibly lend itself to the types of speculative
a.buse that the statute was designed to prevent. By far the greater )
w~ty is to the effect that a "12ragmatic" approach to
§ 16 (b) will best serve the statutory goals. See, e. g., Roberts v.
Eaton, 212 F. 2d 82 (CA2), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 827 (1954);
Fen·aiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342 (CA6 1958) , cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F. 2d 304 (CA9),
cert. denied, 382 U. S. 892 (1965); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F. 2d 507
(CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Petteys v. Butter,
367 F. 2d 528 (CAS 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). For
a discussion and critical appraisal of the various "approaches" to
the interpretation and application of § 16 (b), see Lowenfels, Section 16 (b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Conn.
L. Q. 45 (1969); Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate
Consideration: A Section 16 (b) "Purchase or Sale?," 117 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1034 (1969); Note , Relinncc Electric nnd 16 (b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective Approach?, 58 Va. L. Rev. 907
(1972); Gadsby & Treadway, "Recent Developments Under Section
16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 N. Y. L. Forum
687 (1971).

'?
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gressional objectives without extending the reach of the
statute beyond its intended limits. The statute requires
the inside short-swing trader to disgorge all profits realized on all "purchases" and "sales" within the specified
time period, without proof of actual abuse of insider information, and without proof of intent to profit on the
basis of such information. Under these strict terms, the
prevailing view is to apply the statute only when its application would serve its goals. "[W]here alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders." Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co., supra, at 424. See Blau v. Lamb, ·
363 F. 2d 507 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 1002
(1967). Thus, "[i]n interpreting the terms 'purchase'
and 'sale,' courts have properly asked whether the particular type of transaction involved is one that gives
rise to speculative abuse." Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co., supra, at 424, n. 4.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Occidental
became a "beneficial owner" within the terms of § 16 (b)
when, pursuant to its tender offer, it "purchased" more
than 107'o of the outstanding shares of Old Kern. We
must decide, however, whether a "sale" within the ambit
of the statute took place eithe~ Occidental became
irrevocably oun
rn
for s ares o
enneco pursuant to the terms of the
merge~eement between Old Kern and Tenneco-or
whe ~gave an option to Tenneco to purchase
from Occidental tlie Tenneco s 1ares so acqmre .-

j

27
Both events occurred within six month:; of Occidental's first
acquisition of Old Kern shares pursuant to it:; tender oiler. Although
Occidental did not exchange its Old Kern shares until December 11,
1967, it is not contended that that dale, rather than the date on
which Occidental became irrevocably bound to do so, should control. Similarly, altliough the option was not exerci~ed until December 11, 1967, no liability is asserted with respect to that event, be-
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III
On August 30, 1937, the Old Kern-Tenneco merger
agreement was signed, and Occidental became irrevocably
entitled to exchange its shares of Old Kern stock for
shares of Tenneco preference stock. Concededly the
transaction must be viewed as though Occidental had
made the exchange on that day. But even so, did the
exchange involve a "sale" of Old Kern shares within the
meaning of § 16 (b)? We agree with the Court of Appeals that it did not. for we think it totally unrealistic
to assume or infer from the facts beforeustliat cc1 ental
e!.t.ber had or was like~ave access to inside information, by reason of its ownership of more than 10%, of the
outstandmg s 1iifeSOT" Old Kern, so as to afford it an
opportunity tor~, short-swing profits from
its disposition within six months of its tender offer
purchases.
When, on May 8, 1967, Occidental made an irrevocable
offer to purchase 500,000 shares of Old Kern stock at a
price substantially above market, it cannot be con tended
that Occide11tal was then an insider. At that time, it
owned only 1,900 shares of Old Kern stock, far fewer than
the 432,000 shares needed to constitute the 105-'o ownership required by the statute. There is no basis for finding that, at the time the tender offer was commenced,
Occidental enjoyed an insider's opportunity to acquire
information about Old Kern's affairs.
It is also wide of the mark to assert that Occidental,
as a sophisticated corporation knowledgeable in matters
of corporate affairs and finance, knew that its tender
ofier would either succeed or would be met with a "defensive merger." lf its takeover efiorts failed, it is
argued, Occidental knew it could sell its stock to the
<'HU~r
~itioll

it occurred more than six months after Oreidental'H ln~t ncquiof Old Kern stock.
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target company's merger partner at a substantial profit.
Calc·ulations of this sort. however, "·hether speculative
or not and whether fair or unfair to other stockholders
or to Ole! Kern, do not represent the kind of speculative
abuse at which the statute is aimed, for they could not
have been based on inside information obtained from
substantial stockholclings that did not yet exist. Accepting both that Occidental made this very prediction and
that it \Yould recurringly be an accurate forecast in
tender-offer situations/x we nevertheless fail to perceive
how the fruition of such anticipated events would require, or in any \\"ay depend upon, the receipt and m:e
of inside information. If there are evils to be redressed
hy way of deterring those who \\"Oulcl make tender offers,
~ 16 (b) does not appear to us to have been designed for
this task.
acquired more than
B Ma
ern.
t was thus
~~~~~~~~--~~~~~
a statutory ms1der w1en, on
ay 1, it extended its
tender offer to include another 500,000 shares. We are
quite unconvinced, however, that the situation had
changed materially with respect to the possibilities of
speculative abuse of inside information by Occidental.
Perhaps Occidental anticipated that extending its offer
~' Althou~h a "defrn~ive rnrr~er" is onr tart ic nvnilnble to inrmnIJrnt mnna~rmrnt in it~ :ll"~rnal of anti-trndC'I' ofTrr wrapon~. it is
b~· no mrnn~< n forrgone conclusion that it is the re~pon~r that will
hr most often, much lr~~< invariably, em11lo~'rd. Inrumbrnt managem<•nt. might, for instanrr, choosr to exhort sh:1rrholder::; not to tendrr,
rmploy various techniqurs to rlevatr the markrt prier of thr company's stock in order to make the trndC'I' offer It·~~ attractiw, instit utr lrgnl proceedings, or incren~e the company's outstanding ~tock.
Any one of thesr drvires might provr more attmrti\·c to incumbrnt
mnn:tgernrnt thnn a clefen~ive mrrgrr which could pro\·r to br highly
drtrimental to thr rntrrpri~r. Ser Notr, Drfensivr Tnrtics Emplo)·rd b~· Inc-umbent M:m:tgrmrnts in Contesting Trncler Offers,
21 Stan. L. Rrv. 110-l (1969).

'

.
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would increase the likelihood of the ultimate success of
its takeover attempt or the occurrence of a defensive
merger. But again, the expectation of such benefits was
unrelated to the use of information unavailable to other
stockholders or members of the public with sufficient
funds and the intention to make the purchases Occidental
had offered to make before June 8, 1967.
The possibility that Occidental had, or had the oppor- ~
tunity to have, any confidential information about Old
Kern before or after May 11, 1967, seems extremely remote. Occidental was, after all, a tender offeror, threatening to seize control of Old Kern, displace its management, and use the company for its own ends. The Old
Kern management vigorously and immediately opposed
Occidental's efforts. Twice it communicated with its
stockholders, advising against acceptance of Occidental's
offer and indicating prior to May 11 and prior to Occidental's extension of its offer, that there was a possibility
of an imminent merger and a more profitable exchange.
Old Kern's management refused to discuss with Occidental officials the subject of an Old Kern-Occidental
merger. Instead, it undertook negotiations with Tenneco and forthwith concluded an agreement, announcing
the merger terms on May 19. Requests by Occidental
for inspection of Old Kern records were sufficiently frustrated by Old Kern's management to force Occidental to
litigation to secure the information it desired.
There is, therefore, nothing in connection with Occidental's acquisition of Old Kern stock pursuant to its
tender offer to indicate either the ~sibility of inside
information being available to Occidental by virtue of
i~wnership or the potential for speculative abuse
of such inside information by Occidental. Much the
same can be said of the events leading to the exchange of
Occidental's Old Kern stock for Tenneco preferred, which
is one of the transactions that is sought to be classified
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a "sale" under § 16 (b). The critical fact is that the exchange took place and was required )Ursuant to a mero·er
merger was not
be ween
1
ern an
enneco. That--,.....__
.
engm~red oy
cc1 ental but was sought by Old Kern
to frustrate the attempts of Occidental to gain control
of Old Kern. Occidental obviously did not participate
in or control the negotiations or the agreement between
0
ern an
en 1eco.
. l\ ewmark v. RKO General,.
425 F. 2d 348 ( CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 ( 1970) ;
Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F. 2d 984 (CA2), cert.
denied, 332 U. S. 761 (1947). Once agreement between
those two companies crystalized, the course of subsequei1t
events was out of Occidental's hands. Old Kern needed
the consent ·~t as it turned out, Old
Kern's management had the necessary votes without the
affirmative vote of Occidental. The merger agreement
was approved by a majority of the stockholders of Old
Kern, excluding the votes to which Occidental was entitled by virtue of its ownership of Old Kern shares. See
generally Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F. 2d 342 (CA6
1958), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 927 ( 1959) ; Roberts v.
Eaton, 212 F. 2d 82 (CA2 1954). Occidental, although
registering its opinion that the merger would be beneficial
to Old Kern shareholders, did not in fact vote at the
s~ at whi~h merger approval wasObtained. Under California law, its abstention was tantamount to a vote against approval of the merger. Moreover, at the time of stockholder ratification of the merger,
Occidental's previous dealing in Old Kern stock was, as
it had always been, fully disclosed.
Once the merger and exchange were approved, Occidental was left with no real choice with respect to the
future of its shares of Old Kern. Occidental was in no
position to prevent the issuance of a ruling by the Internal Revenue Service that the exchange of Old Kern
stock for Tenneco preferred would be tax-free; and,

f

I

71-1050-0 PINION
lH

KEHN CTY. LAND CO. v.

OCCID~?\ITAL

t>ETHOLJ.:Ul\T

although various la\Ysuits were begun in state ancl federal
courts seeking to postpone the merger closing beyond
the statutory six months period, those efforts were futile.
The California Corporation Commissioner issued the necessary permits for the closing that took place on August 30, 1937. The merger left no right in dissenters to
secure a )raisal of their ~ Occidental could, of
course, have disposed of Its s 1ares of Old Kern for cash
before the merger was closed. Such an act "·otllcl have
been a § 16 (b) sale and would have left Occidental with
a prima facie § 16 (b) liability. It \Yas not, therefore, a
realistic alternative for Occidental as long as it felt that
it could successfully defend a suit like the present one.
See generally Petteys v. Butler, 367 F. 2d 528 (CAS
1966). cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1006 ( 1967); Fermiolo v.
Newman, supra; Lyman v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104
(Del. 1967); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361
(SDNY 1951). We do not suggest that an exchange of Jf
stock ursuant to a merger may never result in ~ 16 (b) )
)ia!Jilitv. But t 1e involuntary nature of Occidental's
exchange, when coupled with the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information. convinces us that § 16 (b) should not apply to transactions
such a.s this one.

IV
Petitioner also claims that the Occidental-Tenneco option agreement should' itself be considered a sale either
because it was the kind of transaction the statute was
designed to prevent or because the agreement \\·as an
option in form but in fact a sale. But the mere execu- JA
tion of an option to sell is not generally regarded as a. V{
"sale." See Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F. 2d 1
(CAl 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, 309
F. Supp. 75 (Wis. 1970); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co.
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Andreas, 230 F. Supp. !162 (RD~Y Hl65). And we
do not find in the execution of the Occidental-Tenneco
option agreement a sufficient possibility for the speculative abuse of inside information with respect to Old Kern's
affairs to warrant holding that the option agreement was
itself a "sale" ".:ithin the meaning of ~ 16 (b). The
mutual advantages of the arrangement appear quite clear.
As the District Court found, Occidental wanted to avoid
the position of a minority stockholder with a huge investment in a company over which it had no control and
in which it had not chosen to invest. On the other hand,
Tenneco did not want a potentially troublesome minority
stockholder that had just been vanquished in a fight for
the control of Old Kern. Motivations like these do 11ot
smack of insider trading; and it is not clear to us, as it
was not to the Court of Appeals, how the negotiation
and execution of the option agreement gave Occidental
any possible opportunity to trade on inside information
it might have obtained from its position as a major
stockholder of Old Kern. Occidental wanted out, but
only at a date more than six months hence. It was willing to get out at a price of $105 per share, a price at which
it had publicly valued Tenneco preferred on May 10
\\'hen the Tenneco-Old Kern agreement was announced.
In any event, Occidental was dealing with the putative
new owners of Old Kern who undoubtedly knew more
about Old Kern and Tenneco's affairs than did Occidental. If Occidental had leverage in dealing with Tenneco, it is incredible that its source was inside information rather than the fact of its large stock ownership
itself.
Neither does it appear that the option agreement, as
drafted and executed by the parties, offered measurable
possibilities for speculative abuse. What Occidental
granted was a "call" option. Tenneco had the right to
Y.
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buy after six months, but Occidental could not force
Tenneco to buy. The price was fixed at $105 for each
share of Tenneco preferred. Occidental could not share
in a. rising market for the Tenneco stock See Silverman
v. Landa, 306 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1966). If the stock fell
more than $10 per share, the option might not be exercised, and Occidental might suffer a. loss if the market
further deteriorated to a. point where Occidental was
forced to sell. Thus, the option, by its very form, left
Occidental with no choice but to sell if Tenneco exercised the option, which it was almost sure to do if the
value of Tenneco stock remained relatively steady. On
the other hand, it is difficult to perceive this speculative
value to Occidental if the stock declined and Tenneco
chose not to exercise its option. See generally Note,
Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act, 69 Yale L. Rev. 868 (1960); Filer,
Understanding Put and Call Options, 96-111 (1959);
Leffler, The Stock Market, 363-378 (2d ed. 1957).
The option, therefore, does not appear to have been
an instrument with potential for speculative abuse,
whether or not Occidental possessed inside information
about the affairs of Old Kern. In addition, the option
covered Tenneco preference stock, a. stock as yet unissued,
unregistered, and untraded. It was the value of this
stock that underlay the option and that determined
whether the option would be exercised, whether Occidental would be able to profit from the exercise, and
whether there was any real likelihood of the exploitation
of inside information. If Occidental had inside information when it negotiated and signed the option agreement,
it was inside information with respect to Old Kern.
Whatever it may have known or expected as to the future
value of Old Kern stock, Occidental had no ownership
position in Tenneco giving it any actual or presumed
insights into the future value of Tenneco stock. That
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was the critical item of intelligence if Occidental was to
use the option for purposes of speculation. Also, the
date for exercise of the option was over six months in the
future, a period that, under the statute itself, is assumed
to dissipate whatever trading advantage that might be
imputed to a major stockholder with inside information.
See Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporation
Consolidation: A Section 16 (b) "Purchase or Sale?,".
217 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1034, 1054 (1969); Silverman v.
Landa, 306 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1962). By enshrining the
statutory period into the option, Occidental also, at least
if the statutory period is taken to accomplish its intended
purpose, limited its speculative possibilites. Nor should
it be forgotten that there was no absolute assurance that
the merger, which was not controlled by Occidental,
would be consummated. In the event the merger did
not close, the option itself would become null and void.
Nor can we agree that we must reverse the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the option agreement was in
fact a sale because the premium paid was so large as
to make the exercise of the option almost inevitable, particularly when coupled with Tenneco's desire to rid itself
of a potentially troublesome stockholder. The argument
has force, but resolution of the question is very much a
matter of judgment, economic and otherwise, and the
Court of Appeals rejected the argument. That court
emphasized that the premium paid was what experts had
said the option was worth, the possibility that the market might drop sufficiently in the six months following
execution of the option to make exercise unlikely and the
fact that here, unlike the situation in Bershad v. M cConough, 428 F. 2d 693 (CA7 1970) , the optionor did not
surrender practically all emoluments ..tm4 ownership by
executing the option. Nor did any other special circumstances indicate that the parties understood and intended

~
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that the option was in fact a sale." 9 ·we see no satisfactory basis or reason for disagreeing with the judgment
of the Court of Appeals in this respect.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

So ordered.

""In Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F. 2d 693 (CA7 1970), thP
dcfcndnnts were director~ and greater-than-ten-percent stockholders
of Cudahy Company. The defendant~. within ~ix months of their
acqui8ition of beneficinl ownership of Cudahy, granted an option to
Smelting Refining and Mining Company to purchase their Cudnh:v
1-'tock. The Se1•enth Circuit held that the p;rnnt of the option was a
~Hi (b) "sale" of the Cudahy stork. The Court of Appeals in the
present cn~c Jistinguishcd Bershad as follows:
"That. case came before the court of appeals on a finding b)· the
district court that, under the circum~:;tances there pre~entrd, the stock
had in fact been sold within the six months prriod, although the
option was not formal!~· exercised until later. The di~trict comt
had relied on a number of circumstances, the most significant being
that the optionor gaYe the optionee an irreYocable prox~· to vote the
~hare~ and that. the opt ion or and one of hi~ as~oriatr directors resigned as directors within a few days after the grant of the option
nnd were replaced b)' officers of the optio11ce. In other words, thr
district court found in effect that the 'option' w:1s aceompnllicd b)• :1
wink of thr c~·e, and the comt of nppcal~ sustained this. Here thrrc
is no such finding, and no basis for one." 450 F . 2d, at 165.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

I concur in the opinion of the Court, but write briefly to
supplement what has been said as to whether the Old Kern-Tenneco
merger coostitute a "sale" by respondent wlth1n the mean1ng of
· §16(b). • The purpose of§ 16(b) is clear and the relevant language
of the Act is explicit. There have been few problems in the customary
type of transaction where truddauU.ftla11Ja an identifiable "1nsider"
purchases or sells stock for cash. But, as the opinion of the Court
noted, the courts have had difficulty with the question whether to
include or exclude certain "unorthodox" transacticm.s (supra at 11),
and certainly a counsel advising clients with respect to such
\

transactlDns have lacked def1nittve ga•lalla...,

\

I

\
\

*The transaction actually took the form of a transfer of the business
and assets of Old Kern to New Kern (a subsidiary of Tenneco created
for the purpose) 1n exchange for preference stock of Tenneco, followed
by the liquidation of Old Kern and the distributicm 1ft liquidation of
the Tenneco preference shares to the stockholders of Old Kern. The
parties are in agreement that the transaction is the equivalent, for
purposes of deciding the § 16(b) issue in this case, of a statutory
merger, and it has been denominated in the briefs, oral argument
and opinion of the Court as a merger.

·.

. ..

1'

\\

2.
guidance* • In view of the wide variety of such transactions and
the circumstances under which they are accomplished, it is simply
not feasible .. certainly in the absence of greater refinement in the
statutory definitions or the applicable

x•s•W•• regulations - to

enunciate guidelines that would provide the type of certainty which
the law normally should afford with respect to commercial
transactions.
A number of courts have applied a "pragmatic approach
factually oriented as the best means of implementing the statutory
goals of

§

16(b).**

The inquiry under this approach, often a

difficult and even subjective one, is whether the particular

*Tlie mOst typical example of "unothordax" transfers or exchanges

of securities include those resulting from mergers, sales of assets
pursuant to plans of liquidation (other corporate reorganizaticms,
stock reclassifications, conversions, redemptioos and-the like.
See 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1069 (2d ed 1961).

**See authorities cited supra, at 12, note 26.

\

\

\

\

\

\
\

\
I

\

3.

transaction is susceptible of the short-swing profit abuse by insiders
against
which is the evilfivhich Congress legislated. I can suggest no
sounder nor more specific method of analysis as a general approach
to the merger type transaction. It seems to

m~

however, that the

Court need n<X have reached the inquiry made in the "pragmatic"
cases. That inquiry, as stated in the Court's opinion today is whether
"Occidental either had or was likely to have access to insider
information, by reason of its ownership of more than 10% of the
outstanding shares of Old Kern, so as to afford it an opportunity
reap speculative, short-swing profits from its
•MpcaW

dluMar••""'•••

II••" disposition within six months of its tender officer

of purchases. "

SUp~

at 14.

I agree fully with the Court that it is "totally unrealistic"
to assume or infer that Occidental has any such access to inside
information. But under the facts in this case, this inquiry is
quite immaterial. We start from the fact that no one suggests

4.
that Occidental possessed any such information at the time it
commenced its tender offer. It was then k wholly an outsider,
possessing no way of obtaining information other than that generally
available to the public. The inquiry, under a different factual
situation, would have been quite pertinent after OCcidental acquired I

by virtue of its tender offer - ownership of more than 1O% of the
'

I

~

I

outstanding shares of Old Kern.

''

I'

II

But here the transaction which is said to have constituted a
"'sale" was a merger in which respondent took no part whatever.

/
, It neither controlled, engineered nor even voted for the merger.

Indeed, the record is undisputed that petitioner negotiated the
:D11J merger for the very purpose of frustrating respoodent 's

ambiti0111 to acquire a ex controlling position in Kern. Or, putting
it differantly, respondent was an adversary of the parties who
planned .'and consummated this merger. Regardless of the extent
to which he1 may have had "inside information", he could neither
I'

block the1 merger • nor assure its consummation. The coo.version

/

5.

of respondent's shares in Old Kern into New Kern resulted from the
consequences of the merger under California law. There was no
act of volition .. indeed no relevant act at all .. on the part of
respondent with respect to the accomplishment of the merger.
The concept of a purchase or a sale necessarily connc:tes some
v olition, b !·, a willing or conscious act on the part of the 10%
owner to accomplish a change {by purchase, sale, exchange or
otherwise) a change 1n his investment. There may well be close
cases where the investment change results, as it does in a merger,
from the operation of law In which a 1O% owner is in fact an insider
who significantly influences the merger decision under circumstances
where the"posstbillty of abuse" test must be applied. But this is
no such case.

.X
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